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  The	   Tax	   Administration	   Research	   Centre	   undertakes	   research	   on	   tax	  administration	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   the	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	  understanding	   of	   tax	   operations	   and	   policies.	   The	   Centre	   is	   operated	   in	  partnership	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter	  and	  the	  Institute	  for	  Fiscal	  Studies.	   It	   is	  funded	  by	   the	  Econonimc	   and	   Social	  Research	  Council,	  Her	  Majesty’s	   Treasury	  and	   Her	   Majesty’s	   Revenue	   and	   Customs.	   The	   research	   of	   the	   centre	   is	  multidisciplinary	   and	   the	   research	   team	   includes	   economists,	   accountants,	  expreimentalists	  and	  psychologists.	  	  For	  more	  information	  about	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  centre	  see:	  http://tarc.exeter.ac.uk	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Measuring	  Outcomes:	  TARC	  Discussion	  Paper:	  
A	  review	  of	  academic	  literature	  	  
Introduction	  	  This	  review	  has	  been	  written	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  2014	  publication	  by	  the	  OECD	  Forum	  on	  Tax	  Administration	  report	  Measures	  of	  Tax	  Compliance	  Outcomes.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  canvass	  a	  selection	  of	  academic	  literature	  that	  is	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  the	  challenges	  of	  outcome	  measurement	  in	  other	  spheres,	  given	  that	  limited	  academic	  research	  has	  taken	  tax	  administration	  as	  a	  specific	  focus.	  	  	  The	   rise	   of	   performance	   measurement	   (PM)	   systems	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   has	  been	  widely	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  significant	   international	   trend;	  a	  key	   feature	  of	  the	   New	   Public	   Management	   movement.	   This	   trend	   has	   not	   gone	   unnoticed	  within	   tax	  administrations.	   Increasingly,	  PM	  systems	  are	  being	  used	  to	  account	  for	  ‘production’	  within	  tax	  administrations.	  	  	  Although	  PM	  systems	  are	  common	  in	  tax	  administration,	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  this	   is	  scarce.	  This	  review	  opens	  by	  highlighting	  central	  points	  from	  the	  few	  academic	  studies	  of	  PM	  in	  tax	  administration.	  Then	  the	  review	  briefly	  describes	  studies	  which	  show	  challenges	  in	  using	  specifically	  output-­‐based	  PMs—which	  is	  the	  most	   common	   form	   of	   PM	   used	   in	   the	   Public	   Sector.	   This	   then	   leads	   to	   a	  review	  of	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  emergent	  trend	  of	  using	  outcome-­‐based	  PM	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  OECD	  study	  to	  which	  this	  review	  seeks	  to	  contribute.	  	  	  A	   key	   objective	   of	   this	   review	   is	   to	   show	   that	  while	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   supplement	  
output-­‐based	   PMs	  with	  outcome-­‐based	   PMs,	   research	  also	   shows	   that	  outcome-­‐based	   PMs	   have	   their	   own	   drawbacks—or	   what	   might	   be	   called	   ‘unintended	  consequences’.	   These	   are	   often	   hidden	   when	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   logic	   planning,	  steering	   and	   controlling	   with	   PMs.	   In	   this	   approch,	   focus	   is	   righty	   on	   best	  practice,	   international	   standards	   and/or	   guidelines.	   What	   the	   academic	  literature	  can	  add	  to	  this	  is	  that	  the	  use	  of	  output-­‐	  and	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs	  is	  far	  from	   linear	   and	   straightforward,	   but	   rather	   can	   lead	   to	   unexpected	   challenges	  and	  outcomes.	  	  	  
Output-­‐based	   Performance	   Measurement	   in	   Tax	  
Administration	  	  The	   studies	  on	  output-­‐based	  PMs	   in	   tax	  administration	  have—curiously—been	  conducted	  in	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  and	  African	  tax	  administrations.	  	  	  	  Grandcolas	   studied	  management	   strategies	   of	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   tax	   administrations.	  He	  argues	  for	  the	  use	  of	  PMs	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  output	  to	  be	  produced.	  Such	  PMs	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relate	   to	   the	   “number	   of	   tax	   inquiries	   handled	   per	   person	   years”	   or	   the	   “time	  taken	   to	   answers	   inquiries	   by	   e-­‐mail”	   (Grandcolas,	   2006:	   10).	   According	   to	  Grandcolas,	   such	   a	   focus	   enables	   clear	  measures	  of	   performance	   and	  progress.	  Grandcolas’	   approach,	   by	   focusing	   on	   concrete	   measurable,	   is	   appealing,	   yet,	  much	   research	   and	   practical	   experience	   has	   shown	   that	   this	   approach	   to	  performance	  measures	   is	   prone	   to	   gaming	   and	  manipulation	   (see	   later	   in	   this	  review),	   and	   it	   is	   too	   simplistic:	   Accomplishing	   internal	   tasks	   does	   not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  the	  desired	  external	  outcomes.	  	  	  Cantens	  et	  al	  (2010)	  studied	  the	  implementation	  of	  performance	  contracts	  in	  the	  Cameroon	   Customs	   authority.	   There,	   contracts	   made	   between	   the	   General	  Director	   and	   front	   line	   officers,	   were	   predominantly	   implemented	   because	   of	  accusations	   of	   corruption	   and	   their	   aim	   was	   to	   set	   up	   clear	   task	   objectives	  (outputs)	   for	   customs	   officers.	   The	   study	   evaluates	   the	   use	   of	   these	   individual	  performance	   contracts	   as	   positive;	   the	   outcome	   has	   been	   lower	   corruption,	  higher	   revenue	   collection,	   and	   shorter	   clearance	   time	   (ibid:	   70).	   Although	  evaluating	  the	  system	  positively,	  Cantens	  et	  al.	  also	  have	  their	  reservations.	  They	  observe	   that	   the	   system	  of	  performance	  contracts	  had	  only	  been	   in	  place	   for	  a	  few	   months	   and	   also	   they	   comment	   on	   the	   fragility	   of	   the	   system,	   as	   they	  acknowledge	   that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   “..impossible	   to	   establish	   a	   reliable	   and	   constant	  measurement	  system”	  (Cantens	  et	  al	  (2010):	  69).	  	  	  A	  third	  example	  of	  research	  into	  PM	  in	  tax	  administration	  is	  the	  work	  by	  Muñoz	  (2013)	   who	   studied	   the	   implementation	   of	   management	   by	   objectives	   in	   the	  Cameroonian	  tax	  administration.	  In	  this	  PM	  system,	  tax	  inspectors’	  performance	  is	  measured	  against	  certain	  aims	   for	  revenue	  collection.	   In	   this	  case,	   it	  was	   the	  
potential	  for	  revenue	  that	  served	  as	  a	  yardstick	  of	  performance	  for	  the	  inspectors	  and	  this	  potential	  for	  revenue	  was	  broken	  down	  into	  revenue	  quotas	  for	  each	  tax	  unit	   and	   their	   respective	   staff.	   Hence,	   each	   tax	   unit	   and	   each	  member	   of	   staff	  were	  assigned	  targets	  for	  how	  much	  revenue	  they	  ought	  to	  collect	  (Muñoz,	  2013:	  43).	  While	   rationally	   contrived,	  Muñoz’s	   study	   shows	   that	   the	   goal	   of	  potential	  
for	  revenue	  had	  unintended	  effects	  as	  this	  ruled	  out	  other	   legitimate	  goals	  such	  as	   getting	   more	   tax	   payers	   registered—which	   was	   an	   activity	   that	   did	   not	  generate	  revenue	  immediately.	  	  The	   findings	  of	   these	  articles	   are	   interesting	  because	   they	   relate	   specifically	   to	  tax	   and	   customs	   administrations	   and	   because	   also	   they	   show	   examples	   of	   the	  most	   widespread	   and	   commonly	   used	   output-­‐based	   PM,	   albeit	   in	   developing	  countries.	  For	  instance,	  number	  of	  tax	  inquiries	  handled,	  processing	  or	  clearance	  time	   and	   quantitative	   revenue	   targets.	   All	   of	   these	   output-­‐based	   PMs	   are	   also	  widespread	  in	  tax	  administrations	  in	  the	  global	  North.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  more	  clearly	  what	  the	  problems	  and	  challenges	  are	  with	  these	  output-­‐based	  PMs,	  we	  need	  to	  move	  to	  the	  vast	  literature	  criticising	  output-­‐based	  measures	  in	  more	  general	  terms,	  drawing	  on	  experiences	  in	  other	  ares	  of	  government.	  This	   is	   important,	  because	  while	  tax	  authorities	  have	  unique	  roles	  and	   responsibilities,	   they	   also	   share	   many	   common	   characteristics	   with	   other	  
TARC	  Discussion	  Paper:	  Measuring	  outcomes:	  	  	  	  
	   5	  
governmental	   agencies	   and	   there	   are	   valuable	   lessons	   to	   be	   learned	   from	  examining	  experiences	  in	  those	  other	  agencies.	  	  
Deficiencies	  of	  output-­‐based	  Performance	  Measures	  	  	  The	  academic	  literature	  that	  criticizes	  output-­‐based	  PMs	  is	  vast	  and	  this	  review	  will	  therefore	  focus	  only	  on	  a	  number	  of	  seminal	  studies.	  	  	  Hood	   and	   Bevan’s	   research	   provides	   a	   key	   contribution	   to	   this	   research	   area	  (Bevan	   and	   Hood	   2006;	   Hood	   2006).	   These	   authors	   show	   that	   since	   the	  mid-­‐2000s	   it	   becomes	   customary	   to	   establish	   public	   service	   (output)	   targets.	   For	  example,	   this	   is	   done	  within	   the	   public	   health	   sector	  where	   targets	   are	   set	   for	  minimizing	   the	   number	   of	   patients	  waiting	  more	   than	   12	  months	   or	  more	   for	  surgical	   operations,	   or	   targets	   may	   be	   set	   for	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   number	   of	  people	  living	  on	  the	  streets	  (Hood,	  2006:	  516).	  The	  UK	  government	  can	  provide	  evidence	   that	   these	   targets	  have	  been	  met,	   yet,	  Hood	  questions	   to	  what	   extent	  the	   reported	   performance	   improvements	   reflect	   actual	   improvement	   (Hood,	  2006).	  Hood	  and	  Bevan’s	  point	   is	   that	  often	   strategic	  behavior	   surrounds	   such	  target	   systems	  whereby	   the	   civil	   servants	   perhaps	  meet	   the	   set	   requirements,	  but	  does	  it	  via	  a	  diminution	  or	  even	  neglect	  of	  quality,	  (Bevan	  and	  Hood,	  2006:	  521).	  The	  results	  are	  that	  civil	  servants	  ‘hit	  the	  target’,	  but	  they	  ‘miss	  the	  point’	  (ibid.	  521).	  	  	  Hood	  and	  Bevan	  also	  describe	  the	  “threshold	  effects”	  which	  refer	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  targets	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	   performance	   among	   a	   range	   of,	   and	   within,	  production	  units	  (	  Bird	  et	  al.	  2005	  ),	  putting	  pressure	  on	  those	  performing	  below	  the	   target	   level	   to	   do	   better,	   but	   also	   providing	   a	   perverse	   incentive	   for	   those	  doing	   better	   than	   the	   target	   to	   allow	   their	   performance	   to	   deteriorate	   to	   the	  standard	   and	   more	   generally	   to	   crowd	   performance	   towards	   the	   target.	   Such	  effects	  can	  unintentionally	  penalize	  agents	  with	  exceptionally	  good	  performance	  but	   with	   a	   few	   failures,	   while	   rewarding	   those	   with	   mediocre	   performance	  crowded	  near	  the	  target	  range	  (p521).	  	  A	   similar	   questioning	   of	   output-­‐based	   PMs	   is	   put	   forward	   in	   Eterno	   and	  Silvermans’	  analysis	  of	  the	  use	  of	  activity	  based	  targets	  in	  New	  York	  City	  Police	  Department	  (2012).	  They	  show	  that	  police-­‐men’s	  daily	  work	  is	  directed	  by	  strict	  PMs,	  and	  that	  the	  police	  worry	  so	  much	  about	  meeting	  these,	  that	   lowering	  the	  crime	  (the	  actual	  outcome)	  has	  become	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  	  	  Meyer	  (1994,	  p.	  103)	  concludes:	  “The	  long	  held	  view	  of	  what	  gets	  measured	  gets	  done	  has	  spurred	  managers	  to	  react	   to	   intensifying	  competition	  by	  piling	  more	  and	  more	  measures	  on	  their	  operations	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  encourage	  employees	  to	  work	  harder.	   As	   a	   result,	   team	  members	   end	   up	   spending	   too	  much	   time	   collecting	  data	  and	  monitoring	  their	  activities	  and	  not	  enough	  time	  managing.”	  	  Newberry	   &	   Pallot	   (2004)	   examine	   elements	   of	   New	   Public	   Management,	  although	   not	   specifically	   performance	   measurement,	   in	   New	   Zealand	   central	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government	   departments	   and	   find	   accounting	   based	   financial	   management	  incentives,	   instead	   of	   improving	   efficiency	   and	   effectiveness,	   had	   the	   opposite	  effect,	  eroding	  resources	  and	  constraining	  managerial	  freedom.	  De	   Bont	   &	   Grit	   (	   2012:	   497)	   write:	   “Performance	   indicators	   give	   a	   poor	  representation	   of	   the	   complexity,	   variety	   and	   dynamics	   of	   public	   service	  production	   and	   can	   create	   effects	   that	   are	   more	   perverse	   than	   beneﬁcial.	  Because	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   deﬁne	   performance	   of	   professional	   work,	   performance	  measurement	  systems	  tend	  to	  grow	  into	  complex	  systems”	  	  Van	  Thiel	  and	  Leeuw	  (2002)	  discuss	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  performance	  measurement	   identifying	   a	   performance	   paradox	   ie	   the	   weak	   correlation	  between	   performance	   indicators	   and	   performance	   itself.	   The	   paradox	   is	   about	  the	  reports	  of	  performance	  rather	  than	  the	  performance	  itself.	  	  	  Finally,	   De	   Bruijn	   (2007)	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	   perverse	   effects	   arising	   from	  public	   sector	   performance	   measurement.	   According	   to	   him,	   it	   provides	   an	  incentive	   for	   strategic	   behaviour,	   as	   described	   by	   Osborne	   and	   Gaebler	   –	  ‘gaming’.	   It	   potentially	   blocks	   innovation,	   particularly	   when	   the	   performance	  measurement	  system	  is	  linked	  to	  financial	  rewards	  for	  example	  bonuses.	  It	  may	  inhibit	   ambition.	   Performance	   measurement	   can	   actually	   obscure	   real	  performance,	   particularly	   when	   information	   is	   aggregated	   so	   that	   causal	  connections	   between	   effort	   and	   performance	   become	   lost.	   A	   divergence	   of	  meanings	  may	  arise	  between	  internal	  actors	  and	  external	  actors,	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  distance	  between	   them,	   the	  more	   likely	   the	  external	   actor	   is	   to	  believe	   the	  measures	  to	  be	  unambiguous.	  Performance	  measurement	  may	  actually	  drive	  out	  a	   professional	   attitude	   because	   the	   organisation	   tends	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	  well-­‐defined	  tasks.	  	  	  De	  Bruijn	  (2007)	  further	  develops	  five	  laws	  of	  performance	  measurement.	  	  1. the	   law	   of	   decreasing	   effectiveness,	   which	   states	   that	   where	   a	  performance	   measure	   has	   high	   impact,	   for	   example	   if	   it	   is	   used	   for	  ranking	   purposes,	   it	   will	   provide	   strong	   incentives	   for	   perverse	  behaviour.	  	  2. the	   law	   of	   mushrooming,	   which	   states	   that	   performance	   measurement	  systems	   have	   a	   tendency	   to	   become	   bloated,	   through	   refinement	   of	  existing	  measures	  and	  indicators,	  creation	  of	  new	  rules	  and	  explanations	  for	  measuring	  and	  rules	  for	  dealing	  with	  exceptions.	  	  3. the	   law	   of	   collective	   blindness,	   whereby	   managers	   and	   new	   staff,	   who	  both	   have	   less	   knowledge	   of	   grassroots	   processes,	   are	   likely	   to	   suffer	  from	  myopia;	   belief	   that	   reported	   performance	   and	   actual	   performance	  are	  more	  highly	  correlated	  than	  they	  in	  fact	  are.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  “peaceful	  equilibrium	   between	   managers	   and	   professionals.	   Management	   is	  satisfied	  with	   the	   impression	   that	   its	   objectives	   are	  being	  achieved.	  The	  professionals	   are	   satisfied	   with	   not	   having	   to	   put	   up	   with	   managerial	  interference,	  or	  even	  with	  being	  rewarded.”	  (p45)	  4. the	   law	   of	   preservation	   of	   perverted	   systems,	   noting	   that	   once	   a	  performance	   measurement	   system	   has	   become	   embedded	   in	   an	  organisation,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  matter	  to	  abolish	  it	  or	  even	  phase	  it	  out.	  He	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posits	   that	   this	   is	   because	   systems	   have	   a	   ritualising	   tendency	   in	  organisations,	   and	   also	   that	   external	   owners	   of	   the	   measures	   have	   an	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  them.	  	  5. the	  law	  of	  decreasing	  political	  attention:	  once	  performance	  measurement	  is	   institutionalised,	  political	   attention	  declines	   and	   it	   is	  more	  difficult	   to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  abolition	  of	  particular	  measures.	  	  	  To	  recap,	  what	  all	  the	  studies	  demonstrate	  is	  that	  an	  impact	  of	  output-­‐based	  PIs	  can	   be	   that	   civil	   servants	   tend	   to	   care	  more	   about	  meeting	   their	   performance	  goals	  than	  about	  doing	  their	  job	  in	  a	  sound	  manner.	  Hence,	  stand-­‐alone	  output-­‐
based	  performance	  measures	  can	  have	  strong	  gaming	  and	  ‘perverse’	  side	  effects.	  	  	  
Outcome-­‐based	  Performance	  Measures	  as	  a	  rescue?	  	  One	  way	  to	  avoid	   focussing	  solely	  on	  outputs,	   i.e.	   the	  concrete	  activities,	  and	  to	  avoid	  the	  unwanted	  manipulation	  that	  often	  follow	  this,	  is	  to	  use	  outcome-­‐based	  or	  result-­‐based	  PM	  systems.	  In	  these	  systems	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  aims	  for	  outcomes	  and	   results	   which	   the	   given	   institution	  wishes	   to	   generate.	   Importantly,	   these	  results	  are	  “any	  agency-­‐produced	  effect	  on	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  work	  for	  that	  agency”	   (Swiss,	   2005).	   Such	   an	   effect	   could	   for	   instance	   be	   that	   the	   general	  customer	  satisfaction	  increases	  or	  that	  the	  tax	  gap	  lowers.	  The	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  public	  sector	  institutions	  working	  within	  this	  governance	  frame	  will	  be	  more	  outcome/result	   oriented.	   They	   will	   be	   pushed	   to	   become	   more	   reflective	   in	  choosing	  the	  right	  (internal)	  activities	  to	  achieve	  the	  right	  (external)	  results.	  	  	  Increasingly,	  the	  concept	  of	  nudging	   is	  also	  connected	  to	  this	  governance	  frame	  as	   the	   public	   authorities	   gently	   nudges,	   pushes	   or	   directs	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	  citizen	  in	  ways	  that	  they	  see	  appropriate	  (Thaler	  and	  Sunstein,	  2008).	  The	  point	  is	   that	   performing	   any	   activity	   (e.g.	   inspection,	   control,	   service,	   guidance	   or	  information),	  only	  carries	  value	  if	  it	  adds	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   general,	   all	   government	   administrators	   across	   the	   public	   sector	   are	   under	  pressure	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  programmes	  are	  effective	  and	  meet	   the	   expectations	   of	   stakeholders	   (Dubnick	   &	   Fredrickson	   (2011).	   As	  Crandall	  (2010)	  observes,	  without	  a	  comprehensive	  performance	  measurement	  system,	   achievement	   of	   goals	  will	   be	  difficult	   and	   transparency	   lacking.	  Hence,	  steering	   towards	   outcomes	   is	   a	   necessary	   feature	   of	   modern	   public	  administration.	  However,	   as	   Dubnick	   &	   Fredrickson	   (2011:	   38)	   note:	   “[m]easures	   of	  performance,	   if	   based	   upon	   reliable	   data	   and	   kept	   up	   to	   date,	   may	   tell	   the	  organization	  in	  a	  general	  way	  how	  it	  is	  doing.	  As	  guides	  for	  incremental	  program	  adaption,	   reliable	  performance	  data	  are	  helpful.	  But	   such	  measures	  seldom	  tell	  an	   organization	   what	   to	   do”	   (ibid:	   p32).	   Dubnick	   &	   Fredrickson	   (2011:	   38)	  further	  state	  that	  “despite	  the	  envisioned	  beneﬁts	  of	  [performance	  measurement	  systems],	   their	   implementation	   trajectories	   are	   far	   from	   linear	   and	  straightforward:	   various	   difﬁculties	   may	   arise	   along	   the	   way	   that	   lead	   to	  different	  outcomes	  or	  even	  to	  abandonment	  of	  the	  system.	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  Hence,	  although	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs	  are	  advocated	  as	  recommend	  best-­‐practice,	  and	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   trend	   towards	   their	   increased	  use,	   the	   academic	   literature	  shows	   these	   often	   have	   drawbacks	   or	   unintended	   consequences.	   The	   studies	  below	   highlight	   the	   unexpected	   challenges	   and	   consequences	  which	  may	   arise	  from	  using	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs.	  
Challenges	   and	   unintended	   consequneces	   of	   outcome-­‐based	  
PMs	  	  In	  desigining	  outcome	  based	  PM	  systems,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  cognizant	  of	  the	  potential	  pitfalls.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  outlined	  below	  by	  reference	  to	  various	  academic	  studies.	  
-­‐ High	  level	  of	  controversies	  within	  the	  organization	  	  Implementation	   of	   any	   new	   system,	   particularly	   PM	   systems,	   can	   lead	   to	  controversies	   within	   an	   organisation.	   In	   particular,	   problems	   can	   arise	   where	  managers	   used	   to	   dealing	   with	   output	   measures	   are	   uncomfortable	   with	  outcome	  measures.	  Arnaboldi	  &	  Azzone	  (2010)	   investigate	   the	   implementation	  of	   a	   performance	   measurement	   system	   in	   Italian	   universities.	   The	   authors	  provide	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   difficulties	   of	   implementing	   PM	   systems	   in	   public	  sector	  organisations	  more	  broadly.	  From	  this	  study,	  their	  point	  is	  that	  using	  PM	  leads	   to	   controversy	   within	   the	   organizations.	   In	   these	   controversies,	   diverse	  actors	  enact	  different	  tactics	  to	  trying	  to	  reach	  their	  goals.	  Instead	  of	  seing	  this	  as	  a	   (negative)	  problem,	   the	  controversies	  ought	   to	  be	  a	  priority	   for	  management	  because	  these	  can	  positively	  revitalize	   the	   interest	   in	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  PM	  systems.	  	  
-­‐ The	  attribution	  problem	  Bovaird	  (2014)	  describes	  the	  attribution	  problem	  connected	  to	  outcome-­‐based	  	  PMs,	   referring	   to	   the	   ‘cause-­‐and	   effect’	   problem	   in	   determining	   the	   causes	   of	  outcomes,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   factors	   which	   are	   merely	   associated	   with	   the	  outcomes.	  It	  is	  simply	  difficult	  to	  determine	  what	  influences	  a	  specific	  outcome.	  	  	  This	  is	  also	  highlighted	  by	  Boyne	  and	  Law	  (2005)	  who,	  in	  their	  study	  of	  the	  first	  generation	   of	   UK	   Local	   Public	   Service	   Agreements,	   state	   that	   “[m]easuring	  outcomes	   is	   complex,	   and	   is	   more	   so	   in	   some	   service	   areas	   than	   others.	   A	  difficulty	   for	   some	   public	   service	   providers	   is	   that	   outcomes	   are	   strongly	  influenced	  by	  external	  factors	  that	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  control”	  (260).	  They	  also	  advocate	  clear	  articulation	  of	  objectives	  so	  that	  suitable	  and	  robust	  PMs	  can	  be	  identified	  and	  where	  appropriate	  a	  basket	  of	   indicators	  rather	  than	  one	  should	  be	  used,	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  whole	  picture.	  	  	  Mant	   (2001)	   also	   comments	   that	   a	   central	   weakness	   of	   using	   outcome-­‐based	  PMs	  is	  that	  other	  factors	  influence	  them.	  Looking	  at	  health	  care,	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  is	   not	   only	   the	  quality	   of	   the	   care	   that	   determines	   good	  health	   as	   an	   outcome.	  Nutrition,	  environment,	  lifestyle	  and	  poverty	  also	  influence	  health	  outcomes.	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These	   studies	   this	   all	   point	   of	   the	   ‘attribution	   problem’	  which	   is	   an	   inevitably	  problematic	  feature	  of	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs.	  	  Law	   (2013)	   in	   her	   recent	   study	   of	   Welsh	   outcome	   agreements,	   observes	   that	  outcomes	  are	  often	  achieved	  with	  others	  in	  co-­‐production,	  for	  example	  meeting	  recycling	   targets	  may	  depend	  on	   the	  “willingness	  of	   residents	   to	  sort,	   save	  and	  put	  out	  their	  recycled	  materials	  appropriately”.	  In	  a	  tax	  context,	  coproduction	  of	  outcomes	  occurs	  for	  example	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  intermediaries;	  accountants,	  lawyers	   and	   others	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   taxpayers.	   She	   also	   notes	   that	   in	   some	  cases	  external	  factors	  ‘may	  be	  so	  influential	  that	  the	  outcome	  is	  felt	  to	  be	  outside	  of	  the	  control	  of	  the	  organisation,	  so	  service	  managers	  may	  as	  well	  sit	  back	  and	  see	  if	  their	  numbers	  come	  up”.	  	  
-­‐ Deprofessionalization	  Adcroft	  and	  Willis	  (2005)	  warn	  that	  the	  most	  likely	  outcome	  of	  using	  (outcome-­‐based)	   PMs	   in	   public	   administration	   is	   deprofessionalisation	   of	   public	   service	  workers.	  Their	  argument	  built	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  use	  of	  PM	  systems	  will	  ‘commodify’	   relationships	  within	   the	   public	   sector	   and	   that	   this	  will	   affect	   the	  ethical	  distinctiveness	  of	  the	  civil	  servant	  and	  his	  or	  her	  professionalism.	  	  
-­‐ Processes	  are	  more	  important	  than	  outcomes	  Van	   Ryzin	   (2011)	   argues	   that	   the	   focus	   on	   outcomes	   may	   be	   problematic	  because	  trust	  in	  people	  and	  trust	  in	  institutions	  of	  authority	  often	  depends	  more	  on	  process	  (such	  as	  fairness	  and	  equity)	  than	  on	  outcomes.	  	  
-­‐ Distortion	  to	  organizational	  control	  Smith	   (1993)	   focusses	   on	   outcome-­‐based	   PMs.	   First	   he	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	  widespread	   dissemination	   of	   outcome	   performance	   data	   in	   the	   public	   sector.	  Second,	  he	  outlines	  the	  potential	  distortions	  induced	  by	  an	  excessive	  reliance	  on	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs.	  By	  analysing	   concrete	   examples	  of	   outcome-­‐based	  PM,	  he	  shows	   the	   significant	   dysfunctional	   consequneces	   on	   control	   by	   using	  performance	  data.	  	  
-­‐ Dysfunctional	  consequences	  of	  publication	  Mason	   and	   Street	   (2011)	  highlight	   the	  need	   for	   caution	   in	  publishing	   outcome	  data	   in	  their	  study	  of	  the	  health	  sector	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  They	  suggest	  that	  media	  coverage	  of	  ‘poor’	  performance	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  public	  trust,	  which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  tax	  administrations	  could	  conceivably	  lead	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  one	  of	  the	  key	  outcomes:	  securing	  maximum	  voluntary	  compliance.	  The	  authors	  offer	   five	  pointers:	  1.	   recognise	   that	  outcome	  statistics	  may	  be	  constructed	   from	  data	  collected	   for	  other	  purposes	  and	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  caution;	  2.	  recognise	  that	  different	  users	  have	  different	  information	  needs;	  3.	  consult	  with	  target	  groups	  in	  the	  development	  of	  valid	  quality	  indicators;	  4.	  understand	  users’	  modes	  of	  access	  to	   information	  (although	  this	  may	  be	   less	  important	  in	  a	  government	  agency	  where	  users	  do	  not	  have	  choice	  of	  providers);	  5.	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  over-­‐simplify.	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Smith	   (1995)	   developed	   a	   typology	   of	   the	   main	   types	   of	   dysfunctional	  consequences	  arising	  from	  publishing	  outcome	  data	  in	  the	  content	  of	  the	  health	  service.	  	  	  To	  recap,	  many	  studies	  have	  focussed	  on	  the	  potential	  (negative)	  consequences	  of	   outcome-­‐based	   PM	   systems	   in	   the	   public	   sector.	   Together	   they	   point	   at	  different	   caveats.	   These	   are	   all	   important	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	  when	   implementing	  and	   developing	   outcome-­‐based	   PM	   systems	   with	   in	   tax	   and	   customs	  administrations.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  In	  this	  TARC	  Dicssion	  paper	  “Measuring	  Outcomes”	  we	  have	  reviewed	  a	  number	  of	  the	  central	  academic	  studies	  dealing	  with	  output-­‐	  and	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs.	  	  	  Three	  findings	  are	  central	  to	  tax	  administrations:	  	  
-­‐ Output-­‐based	  PMs	  are	  the	  most	  widespread	  indicators	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector	  today.	  However,	  the	  academic	  literature	  has	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  these	  indicators	  can	  have	  strong	  gaming	  and	  ‘perverse’	  side	  effects.	  This	  is	  also	  shown	  in	  studies	  of	  tax	  administrations.	  	  	  	  
-­‐ Outcome-­‐based	  PMs	  are	  newer—but	  also	  becoming	  a	  more	  widespread	  form	  of	  indicator	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector.	  While	  these	  remedy	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  output-­‐based	  PMs,	  outcome-­‐based	  PMs	  carry	  their	  own	  ‘unintended	  consequences’	  and	  challenges.	  	  	  
-­‐ Tax	  authorities	  have	  unique	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  in	  our	  socities.	  Yet,	  they	  also	  share	  many	  common	  characteristics	  with	  other	  governmental	  agencies	  and	  there	  are	  valuable	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  examining	  experiences	  in	  those	  other	  agencies.	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